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Case Summaries
CERCLA
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Vacuum
Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir.
1996)
This case involved a waste transporter
seeking indemnification from its insurer for
three lawsuits stemming from pollution
damage and cleanup of its dumping ac-
tivities. The insurer of Vacuum Tanks, Inc.
(wI), a transporter of liquid waste, was
Bituminous Casualty Corp. (Bituminous).
Seeking a declaratory judgment that
would release it from any duty to pay for
either a defense or indemnification, Bitu-
minous filed suit against VTI. VTI counter-
claimed, charging that Bituminous had a
duty to defend and reimburse VTI for de-
fense costs, and asked the court to grant
punitive damages for bad faith in denial
of coverage. VTI also sought a declara-
tory judgment.
The issue between the parties was
that neither VTl nor Bituminous could find
a copy of the annual policies that WI had
purchased, though Bituminous was able
to locate a "specimen policy" for the
1959-1965 period of coverage. The
trial court ruled in favor of VTI but found
Bituminous not liable for bad faith. On
appeal, the court found VTI did not pre-
sent sufficient evidence to prove the terms
of the policies involving coverage of the
claims. The case was remanded for fur-
ther trial proceedings in which VTI was
again awarded defense costs, plus pre-
judgment interest and attorney's fees.
In the instant appeal, Bituminous
again contended that VT presented insuf-
ficient evidence of the terms of the poli-
cies. WI's evidence included the
specimen policy of the period in question
as well as testimony, internal memos and
records. The appellate court rejected Bi-
tuminous' argument and held that the trial
court did not err in finding that the policy
terms of VTI's coverage matched those of
the specimen policy based on the
232
evidence presented.
On Bituminous' contention that it had
no duty to defend, the appellate court
referred to the fact that the specimen pol-
icy provided liability coverage for dam-
ages caused by destruction or injury to
property incurred in an accident. Bitumi-
nous first charged that there was no prop-
erty damage because Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) claims do not
constitute property damage for insurance
coverage. In applying Texas insurance
law on the duty to defend, which is bi-
ased toward the insured in policy inter-
pretation, the appellate court found that
duty to be present in all three claims
against VTI.
In the alternative, Bituminous argued
that it had no duty to provide coverage
because no accident occurred since VTIs
transportation of waste was a voluntary
and intentional activity. The court disa-
greed, holding Texas law focused on
whether the damages and injuries in-
curred were accidental, not whether the
conduct or actions were accidental.
The appellate court did, however,
modify the trial court's award of attor-
ney's fees to VTIL Bituminous proved on
remand that it was exempt from the pay-
ment of attorney's fees because it was a
stock property casualty company. The
court of appeals held that the Texas
Code exempted contracts issued by insur-
ers subject to the Unfair Claim Settlement
Practices Act, which includes stock and
casualty companies.
- by Wendy Hickey
CLEAN AIR ACT
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, Nos.
94-1044, 94-1062, 1996 WL 184480
(D.C. Cir. Apr. i9, 1996)
In November 1993, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
published two rules designed to help fed-
eral agencies determine whether
"Metropolitan Planning Organizations"
were in compliance with Section 176 of
the Clean Air Act. Six environmental
groups (Environmental Defense Fund)
sought review of these regulations, claim-
ing that several inconsistencies existed
between the EPA regulations and the pro-
visions of the Clean Air Act.
The first challenge presented by the
Environmental Defense Fund was aimed
at a grandfather clause in the EPA regula-
tions. The EPA regulations required a de-
termination that a metropolitan project
complied with the Clean Air Act before a
federal agency could become involved in
the project. The grandfather clause, how-
ever, exempted non-transportation pro-
jects that had been analyzed under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
within the preceding five years and trans-
portation projects that had undergone
such analysis within the preceding three
years.
The Environmental Defense Fund ar-
gued that this grandfather provision was
in conflict with Sections 176(c)(1) and
(c)(2) of the Clean Air Act. The court re-
jected this argument, stating that the
Clean Air Act "vests the Agency with dis-
cretion" to establish the frequency with
which project conformity will be deter-
mined as long as determinations for trans-
portation plans are not less frequent that
every three years. Because the grandfa-
ther clause only exempted projects which
had undergone NEPA review within the
previous three years, the court upheld the
grandfather clause as a reasonable exer-
cise of agency discretion.
The Environmental Defense Fund next
challenged the validity of EPA regulations
allowing for the approval of a state trans-
portation improvement program (TIP) al-
though the program's transportation
control measures (TCMs) were behind the
schedule set out in the state's implementa-
tion plan (SIP). They argued that the
Clean Air Act required the schedules to
be consistent. The court rejected this
MELPR
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challenge, holding that the Clean Air Act
did not require exact correspondence be-
tween the schedules of the TIP, the TCM
and the SIP, but only required that the
schedules be compatible. The court
stated that a contrary conclusion would
require reading the Clean Air Act's con-
sistency requirement too narrowly. The
court also rejected the Environmental De-
fense Fund's argument that the TCMs
would not be eligible for federal funding
without a timely implementation schedule,
since the court found the statute to be am-
biguous and subject to reasonable inter-
pretation by EPA.
Alternatively, the Environmental De-
fense Fund argued that the EPA regula-
tions were in violation of Section 176(c)
of the Clean Water Act, which states that
SIPs are in conformity with the Act only if
they "contribute to annual emissions re-
ductions." They argued that the EPA
regulations were contrary to this section
of the Clean Water Act because, under
the regulations, it was possible for a
transportation plan or improvement plan
to conform with the Clean Air Act even if
it did not produce demonstrable emis-
sions reductions, as long as they were
part of an over-arching plan that would
result in a reduction of emissions. The
court held that the "contribute to" lan-
guage in Section 176(c) was ambiguous.
Once again the court stated that if the
EPA's statutory interpretation was reason-
able, the court had to give it deference.
The next challenge by the Environ-
mental Defense Fund was aimed at EPA's
definition of "transportation projects,"
which included only highway or transit
projects, arguing that Congress intended
to include all manner of transportation.
The court also rejected this argument
based on the fact that metropolitan plan-
ning organizations did not have the abil-
ity to control air, rail, or water
transportation. Because Section
176(c)(2 ) focuses on metropolitan plan-
ning organizations, the court found that it
was reasonable to conclude that its rules
applied only to transportation modes over
which they have control.
The Environmental Defense Fund then
took issue with EPA's definition of
"indirect" emissions, arguing that under
the definition, emissions that were a fore-
seeable result of federal action would be
exempt. The court was not persuaded by
this argument and held that EPA's defini-
tion was consistent with the requirement
that "federally supported activities" must
not contribute to a violation of the Clean
Air Act.
The Environmental Defense Fund also
challenged the language in the EPA regu-
lations indicating that only "major"
sources of emissions would be required to
conform, and that certain categories of
government actions would be exempt.
The court, relying on common law, held
that exceptions from statutory requirements
could be made "as an exercise of
agency power . . . [if] considered de
minimis." The court determined that the
exceptions in the EPA regulations could
be considered de minimis, and therefore,
were not in violation of the Clean Air Act.
Based on the above analysis, the
court denied the petitions for review.
- by Erick Roeder
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Browner,
No. 95-1052, 1996 WL 138507 (4th
Cir. Mar. 26, 1996)
The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) found that Virginia had failed to
comply with Title V of the 1990 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act (CAA). The
EPA stated that Virginia's proposed pro-
gram for issuing air pollution permits did
not comply with Title V because the pro-
gram did not provide for adequate judi-
cial review of its permitting decisions.
Virginia challenged the EPA's finding and
petitioned for review before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Virginia advanced three main argu-
ments. First, it claimed that EPA misinter-
preted the judicial review provisions of
Title V, and that Virginia had corrected
any defects in its proposal that would vio-
late the amended CAA. Second, it
argued that the EPA's original rejection of
its State Implementation Plan (SIP) was
arbitrary and capricious. Lastly, Virginia
alleged that sections of Title V, including
its sanctioning provisions, were unconsti-
tutional in that they wrongfully appropri-
ate the state's legislative processes in
violation of the Tenth Amendment and the
Spending Clause of Article 1, § 8.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected each of Virginia's arguments.
First, the court denied Virginia's request
that the dispute be remanded to the EPA
for review, despite Virginia's assertion
that it had corrected all but one of the
alleged violations in its SIP. The court
held that the EPA could reject an entire
SIP based on just one defect. In addi-
tion, the court stated that the EPA had not
signed off on Virginia's newly-submitted
SIP as required by the CAA.
In denying Virginia's next claim, the
court stated that it must uphold EPA's con-
clusion that Virginia's proposed SIP judi-
cial review provisions were inadequate
unless the EPA's finding was "arbitrary,
capricious . .. or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law." The court stated that
the EPA's ruling withstood this standard of
review because Virginia's SIP did not pro-
vide judicial review of permitting deci-
sions to all persons who would have
standing under Article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Virginia's SIP granted judicial
review only to "any owner aggrieved bV'
a permitting decision but did not provide
the same review to members of the pub-
lic. The court noted that Article III stand-
ing was broader than the review Virginia
provided. The CAA required that stand-
ing be extended beyond aggrieved own-
ers with a pecuniary interest to anyone
who could show: 1) actual or imminent
injury, 2) a causal connection between
the challenged conduct and the injury,
and 3) likelihood the injury would be re-
dressed by favorable judicial action.
In its final argument, Virginia claimed
that Title V and its sanctions section in-
vaded a state's right to determine its own
rules of standing for judicial review. The
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appellate court, however, held that Title V
was not unconstitutional because federal
law may induce state action in areas that
otherwise are beyond the regulatory
reach of Congress. In short, the court
stated, Virginia was blurring the lines be-
tween a federal statute designed merely
to induce state action as opposed to one
that actually coerced a state into exercis-
ing its sovereign power. The court held
that while CAA sanctions for non-
compliance with judicial review provi-
sions may burden states such as Virginia,
those sanctions amount to inducement,
not outright coercion.
Furthermore, the court stated that the
Commerce and Spending clauses of the
U.S. Constitution gave Congress the
power to withhold state highway funds
for non-compliance with the CAA, be-
cause Congressional efforts to eliminate
air pollution promoted the general wel-
fare and also involved the regulation of
potentially-hazardous activities that could
cause air and water pollution across state
boundaries. In a final policy argument,
the court stated that the CAA sanctions
maintained "unity between regulation and
political accountability" because they
hold the federal government accountable
for its decisions in full view of the general
public.
- by Douglas Cohen
NEPA
Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley,
Nos. 95-35052, 95-34214,
95-35215, 1996 WL 165069 (9th Cir.
Apr. 10, 1996)
This decision consolidated three ap-
peals, resulting from challenges to a deci-
sion by the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Interior (federal defendants) on April 13,
1994, that approved a plan to manage
federal lands containing spotted owl
habitat in the Pacific Northwest.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
first addressed appeals by the Native For-
est Council, Forest Conservation Council
and Save the West (the environmental
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plaintiffs). The environmental plaintiff's
challenge concerned the district court's
grant of summary judgment affirming the
Record of Decision for Amendments to
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Man-
agement Planning Documents Within
Range of the Northern Spotted Owl.
In 1993, President Clinton established
the Forest Ecosystem Management Team
(FEMAT) to assist the Secretaries of Agri-
culture and Interior in the formation of for-
est management plans for federal lands
in the Pacific Northwest. Pursuant to that
end, FEMAT narrowed the field of possi-
ble strategies to ten, and the Forest Serv-
ice and the Bureau of Land Management
prepared an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) which covered all of these op-
tions. The Secretaries of Agriculture and
Interior adopted alternative number nine,
spawning this litigation.
The environmental plaintiffs argued
that the federal defendants failed to con-
sider a "no action" alternative, thus violat-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which requires that agencies
consider a reasonable range of alterna-
tives. The Court of Appeals for Fifth Cir-
cuit stated that the federal defendants
were under no obligation to consider
every conceivable alternative, such as
those alternatives that were inconsistent
with overall policy objectives or those al-
ternatives that were unlikely to be imple-
mented. The court noted that the federal
defendants had considered a "no har-
vest" option originally but abandoned it
early as inconsistent with the policy of
balancing competing land uses.
The instant court also addressed the
environmental plaintiffs' argument that the
selected alternative violated a mandate of
the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), that species remain viable.
Once again, the court looked to overall
goals of the relevant acts and found that
compromise for multiple use was accept-
able. The court noted the lower court's
explanation that an alternative offering a
higher likelihood of viability would pre-
clude any multiple use. The court con-
cluded that because there was no
evidence that the federal defendants over-
looked relevant factors or made any clear
errors of judgment, they reasonably com-
plied with the NFMA's viability mandate.
The court of appeals then addressed
the environmental plaintiffs' final argu-
ment regarding the first two appeals. In
essence, the environmental plaintiffs' con-
tended that the preparation of the EIS did
not adequately consider the cumulative
environmental impacts associated with
the chosen alternative. Upon review, the
court stated that the Endangered Species
Act protected endangered species from
harm caused by habitat modification or
destruction, and that it was reasonable to
assume that non-federal land will be man-
aged to avoid harm to the threatened
species. The court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
The court went on to decide a related
appeal, filed by the Northwest Forest Re-
source Council (Council). The Council
appealed the district court's entry of sum-
mary judgment for the federal defendants
on their cross-claims for declaratory relief.
The Council wished to litigate the chal-
lenges in the District of Columbia. The
court of appeals addressed the argument
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the cross-claims for declaratory judg-
ment or alternatively abused its discretion
by exercising its jurisdiction.
The court stated that where jurisdiction
exists, the Declaratory Judgment Act (Act)
is intended to allow earlier access to the
courts to spare potential defendants from
the threat of litigation and to help defen-
dants avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits. The
court found the cross-claim to be appro-
priate under the act in this action, since
the federal defendants were faced with
the possibility of different judgments on
the same issues and the expense of litigat-
ing the issues again in another forum.
The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed
the judgment of the district court.
- by Michael Hunter
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Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v.
Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996)
Western Radio Services (Western)
brought suit against the Department of
Agriculture, United States Forest Service,
and other defendants (the Service), claim-
ing that the Service abused its discretion
when it granted Slater Communications
Corporation (Slater) a special use permit
to build a radio tower at Gray Butte in
the Ochoco National Forest in Oregon.
Western argued that the radio tower
caused interference with its broadcasts
and the grant of permit violated various
regulations, including the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Na-
tional Forest Management Act (NFMA).
Western's claim originally arose
when the Service allowed Slater to build
at Gray Butte. The Forest Supervisor de-
nied Western's claim that Slater's tower
would result in radio frequency interfer-
ence. Western appealed to the Regional
Forester, who upheld the decision but re-
quired meetings to be held between par-
ties sharing the Gray Butte location to
insure that Slater's tower was built in the
best possible location. Western con-
tended it never agreed to the current loca-
tion. Western then filed this action in
district court alleging the permit violated
NEPA and NFMA, which grants the Serv-
ice's authority. Western further claimed
that the Forest Service Manual (Manual)
and Forest Service Handbook (Hand-
book) were also "regulations" that the
Service had failed to comply with. The
district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Service, holding that the
Service did not abuse its discretion in issu-
ing Slater's permit, and that Western
lacked standing to challenge the permit
under NEPA.
After noting that it was proper for the
court to review the case, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth District noted that it
may only overturn the Service's decision
if it found the decision to be arbitrary and
capricious. Here, the court stated that
arbitrary and capricious meant that the
agency relied on factors that Congress
did not intend, entirely failed to consider
important aspects, offered a explanation
countered by evidence, or offered a com-
pletely implausible justification. The court
also noted that it would only entertain al-
legations that the Service did not comply
with regulations if those regulations have
the force of law.
The court of appeals held that the
Handbook and Manual did not have the
force of law, nor did applicable code
sections adopt the Manual and Hand-
book by reference. The two-part "force
of law" test used by the court: 1) the
rules be substantive rather than interpre-
tive; and 2) the agencies have con-
formed to procedural requirements in
promulgating the pronouncements in
question.
On review, the court found that the
Manual and Handbook did not meet the
first requirement because they establish
guidelines for Service authority, not bind-
ing limitations. The court noted that the
Manual and Handbook did not meet the
second requirement either because they
were not promulgated under a specific
grant of authority and in the manner pro-
scribed by Congress; they were not pub-
lished under the Administrative Procedure
Act, nor in the Federal Register or the
Code of Federal Regulations, were not
subject to notice and comment rule mak-
ing, and were not promulgated under
some specific Congressional authority.
The court also dismissed Western's
argument that the Manual and Handbook
were incorporated by reference in other
Service regulations, because incorpora-
tion did not lend the Manual and Hand-
book substantive status if the Manual and
Handbook still lacked the elements from
the force of law test. Having decided
that the Manual and Handbook did not
have the force of law, the court found it
unnecessary to evaluate Western's alle-
gation that the Service had gone beyond
the scope of its authority.
The court of appeals then denied
Western's claim that the Service had not
followed established Service guidelines
and therefore acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously. The code section gave the
discretionary instruction that the Service
should consider if new buildings will
cause interference with existing structures.
However, the court stated that since the
section was discretionary, even if the
Service had not acted upon it, the court
would have no authority. The court also
pointed out that the Service had actually
included a provision protecting against
interference in this particular permit grant,
even though there was no requirement to
do so, and no indication at the time that
there would be interference at all.
Finally, the court dismissed Western's
claim under NEPA. Distinguishing this
case from those where there is at least
some environmental harm in addition to
interference with radio broadcasts, the
court of appeals found that Western al-
leged only harm to the broadcasts, or
economic harm.
The court affirmed the summary judg-
ment of the lower court.
- by Kevin Murphy
CLEAN WATER ACT
Hughey v. JMS Development Corporo-
tion, 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996)
Hughey, a homeowner in Gwinnett
County, Georgia, filed a citizen suit un-
der the Clean Water Act (CWA) seeking
to enjoin JMS Development Corp. (IMS)
from discharging storm water runoff.
Hughey argued that JMS, the developer
of a residential subdivision in Gwinnett
County, was violating the CWA by al-
lowing storm water runoff without possess-
ing a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit setting
forth the conditions under which storm
water could be discharged.
At trial, the evidence showed that
JMS submitted its subdivision plans and
specifications to Gwinnett County for ap-
proval and obtained a county permit to
begin construction. In addition, a CWA
NPDES permit was not then available in
the State of Georgia. Nevertheless, the
district court's interpretation of the CWA
relied upon a "zero discharge" standard,
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which absolutely prohibited the discharge
of any storm water byJMS in the absence
of an NPDES permit. The court ignored
testimony that some storm water dis-
charge beyond the control of JMS would
naturally occur whenever it rained.
The district court issued a permanent
injunction ordering that JMS "not dis-
charge storm water into the waters of the
United States from its development prop-
erty in Gwinnett County, Georgia . . . if
such discharge would be in violation of
[CWA]." The court, also fined JMS for
continuing violations of the CWA and
awarded Hughey attorney fees and
costs. From those orders and judgment of
the district court, JMS appealed.
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, JMS argued that the
broad, generalized language of the in-
junction violated the standard of specific-
ity required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d). JMS s second conten-
tion was that it should not be punished for
failing to secure an NPDES permit when
no such permit was available. Finally,
JMS objected to the award of attorney
fees and costs.
First, the appellate court determined
that Congress could not have intended a
strict application of the zero discharge
standard when compliance is factually
impossible. The court further found that
once JMS began the development, com-
pliance would have been impossible.
The evidence was uncontroverted that
whenever it rained in Gwinnett County,
some discharge was going to occur, re-
gardless of efforts byJMS to prevent it. In
addition, the court determined that Con-
gress did not intend the zero discharge
standard to apply when: 1) a CWA
NPDES permit was not available; 2) the
discharger was in good-faith compliance
with local pollution control requirements
that substantially mirrored the proposed
NPDES discharge standards; and 3) the
discharges were minimal.
The court of appeals vacated the
lower court's injunction, finding that the
district court s order merely required JMS
to stop discharges, but failed to specify
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how JMS was to do so. The court held
that the district court s injunction did not
contain an operative command capable
of enforcement, nor was it tailored to rem-
edy specific harms rather than to enjoin
all possible breaches of the law.
Finally, the appellate court reversed
the district court s award of attorney fees
and costs to Hughey. Under the CWA s
citizen suit provision, a court may issue
costs of litigation to any prevailing party.
However, the reviewing court held that
Hughey was not a prevailing party.
Since the Eleventh Circuit did not find in
favor of Hughey, it was inappropriate to
give such an award.
- by Constance S. Chandler
Shady Valley Park & Pool, Inc. v. Fred
Weber, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995)
Gene Lambrich (Lambrich) purchased
Shady Valley Park & Pool, Inc., (Shady
Valley), in .1965. Originally operating
as a swimming pool, the property be-
came a fee fishing area around 1967.
Shady Valley raised numerous species of
fish, and high quality water was essential
to the success of both the fee fishing and
fish hauling businesses.
The Missouri Highway and Transpor-
tation Commission (MHTC) hired Fred
Weber (Weber) to make improvements to
Missouri State Highway 21. The con-
struction project involved two phases,
with the entire project taking place on
property directly above that which Shady
Valley owned. The contract for both
phases contained special provisions re-
garding the Shady Valley property, which
stated that since the lakes on the Shady
Valley property were stocked with fish,
precautions would have to be taken to
ensure that the lakes were protected from
mud and silt accumulation.
In September, 1987, Weber and his
subcontractor began construction on
Phase 1 of the project. Weber, in imple-
menting the plans of the MHTC, began
clearing the property and removing tree
stumps and roots. These operations
involved stripping the ground to the bare
soil, and took place just above Shady
Valley's lakes. Construction for Phase II of
the project began in the fall of 1988. All
the drainage and silt from the second
phase traveled through the ditch systems
constructed during the first phase, despite
efforts to prevent mud and silt accumula-
tion in the lakes.
As a result of the problems Shady Val-
ley had in obtaining suitable water, the
operation also had difficulty holding an
inventory. The entire Shady Valley com-
plex discontinued operations in October,
1991. Prior to the closing of the busi-
ness, Lambrich tried to obtain relief from
Weber and the MHTC. Negotiations
proved unsuccessful, and Shady Valley
filed its original petition for relief from
Weber and the MHTC on June 1 8,
1990. An amended petition was also
filed, but was eventually dismissed.
Shady Valley charged the MHTC with
separate counts of trespass, inverse con-
demnation, nuisance and negligence.
The petition charged Weber with negli-
gence, and also contained a third party
beneficiary contract claim and a request
for punitive damages.
The MHTC was severed from the
case against Weber, and the trial court
directed a verdict against Shady Valley
on the punitive damages and third-party
beneficiary contract claims. A verdict in
the amount of three million dollars was
entered in favor of Shady Valley on the
trespass and negligence claims. Weber
appealed the judgment, and Shady Val-
ley cross-appealed.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District affirmed the trial court's
judgment in all respects. In affirming the
decision, the court rejected Weber's con-
tention that the "acceptance doctrine"
directly prohibited the imposition of any
liability. This doctrine states that once a
highway contractor's work has been ac-
cepted by the state, the contractor is not
liable to a third party with whom there is
no contractual relationship for injuries that
occur as a result of tortuous conduct. The
acceptance by the state may be
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constructive or practical, but must be
deemed by the court to have occurred in
some manner. The court of appeals held
that damage to the lakes occurred prior
to any conceivable acceptance by the
state. Therefore, the doctrine did not ap-
ply, and Weber was liable for the negli-
gence and forts that occurred while in
possession of the property.
Weber also contended on appeal
that the trial court erred in giving an in-
struction that allowed the jury to provide
that Shady Valley could recover for "all
damages for all time." The instant court
rejected this contention on the basis that
Shady Valley's claims for recovery were
not for nuisance damages alone, but
were also for trespass. The court stated
that a trespasser is liable for damages for
any natural, direct, necessary and proxi-
mate consequences of his action. The
court held that the instruction was valid
when damage to the property went be-
yond mere property loss.
Weber further argued that the trial
court erred in not submitting two re-
quested jury instructions. One instruction
would have allowed the jury to consider
any mitigating circumstances, and the
second instruction was on comparative
fault. On review, the court stated that the
burden of proof for mitigation of dam-
ages is on the defendant. The defendant
must show that the injured party had the
opportunity to mitigate and any reason-
able perspective consequences. The
court also stated that since Weber pre-
sented no evidence that Shady Valley
had the opportunity to mitigate damages,
there was not an adequate showing.
Therefore, the court held that there was
no abuse of discretion in disallowing
Weber's offered instructions.
The final point the court analyzed on
appeal was the right of Shady Valley to
recover punitive damages. Shady Valley
contended that the trial court erred in di-
recting a verdict in favor of Weber on
this issue. The court of appeals held that
the standard of review for a submissable
punitive damages claim was whether a
reasonable juror could have found that
Weber's conduct showed conscious dis-
regard or complete indifference to the
interests of Shady Valley. The court found
that even though Weber's actions were
ineffective at controlling the mud and silt
accumulation, there was no conscious
disregard nor complete indifference to the
interests of Shady Valley. Therefore, We-
ber's activities did not rise to the level of
justifying punitive damages, and Shady
Valley's contention was denied.
- by Tricia Ann Baker
CONSTITUTION
City of Jefferson v. Missouri Dep't of
Natural Resources, 916 S.W.2d 794
(Mo. 1996)
The issue presented by this case was
whether Mo. Rev. Stat. § 260.325 was
unconstitutional, in light of a provision of
the Missouri Constitution found in Article X
(Hancock Amendment). Section
260.325 required counties and cities
that were not members of solid waste
management districts, which had. popula-
tions of over 500 people, to submit a
new or revised solid waste plan that com-
plied with § 260.220-.325. However,
the Hancock Amendment was violated if
both "(1) a new or increased activity or
service is required of a political subdivi-
sion by the State and (2) the political sub-
division experiences increased costs in
performing the activity or service."
The circuit court first addressed this
controversy in City of Jefferson I, holding
that Jefferson City would experience in-
creased costs in its attempt to comply
with § 260.325. As a city with a popu-
lation of over 500 people, Jefferson City
would have been required to file a new
solid waste plan discussing the following:
the separation of household waste, the
reduction of solid waste placed in land-
fills, a timetable for such reduction, mini-
mization of small quantities of hazardous
waste, and establishment of educational
programs. Therefore, the court enjoined
not only future enforcement of §
260.325, but also the development of
solid waste management plans meeting
the "Model Plan Guidelines for Solid
Waste Management." The Missouri De-
partment of Natural Resources (MDNR)
and the State of Missouri appealed.
The Missouri Supreme Court analyzed
whether the increased cost to Jefferson
City was more than de minimis by exam-
ining specific evidence presented by the
city. Although MDNR argued that Jeffer-
son City presented insufficient evidence
showing this increase, the court found
that Jefferson City's demonstration of cost
was adequate. The city's evidence in-
cluded an estimation of costs "two to
three times" over what was spent on pre-
vious waste plans, due to the subsequent
need to employ additional engineers.
Therefore the court held that Jefferson City
need not comply with the mandate to sub-
mit a revised solid waste plan.
With respect to the state's enforce-
ment of the statute against other political
subdivisions that had failed to prove the
existence of increased costs, the supreme
court reversed the lower court's decision.
Absent actual proof of higher costs result-
ing from the plan's development, a city
or county must still meet the requirements
established in § 260.325.
- by Lynette McCloud
OTHER
American States Insurance Co. v.
Nethery, 79 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1996)
In 1991, Mary Jane Nethery, (Neth-
ery) hired DAPA, Inc., (DAPA) to paint
portions of the interior of her home.
Nethery claimed she explicitly contracted
for the repairs to be made with special
paint that would be "non-toxic" to her,
because of her hypersensitivity to chemi-
cals. However, DAPA used regular in-
dustry paint in glue in Nethery's home.
She specifically contended that she was
allergic to the chemical 1, 1,1 trichloro-
ethane, (1,1,1 tca) found in the paint
DAPA used, and that the fumes from the
materials injured her and caused the loss
of part of her home. She sued DAPA, its
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president and the franchisor, (the in-
sureds) alleging breach of contract, gross
negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The insureds looked
to their insurer, American States, for de-
fense and coverage of Nethery's claims.
American States filed the declaratory ac-
tion involved in the instant case.
The district court held that American
States did not have a duty to defend
against Nethery's claims for breach of
contract and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; however, it did have a
duty to defend against her gross negli-
gence claim, and the claim was not
barred from coverage by a pollution ex-
clusion clause contained in the policy.
American States appealed, contending
that the absolute pollution exclusion did
apply to bar Nethery's claim.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that if an insurance policy is unam-
biguous, its terms must be given their
plain meaning and enforced as written.
Unless the lower court were to find the
exclusion ambiguous on its face, the court
would lack the prerogative to engraft limi-
tations on the exclusion as it appears in
the policy.
The instant court determined that
American States pollution exclusion
clearly applied in this case. The exclu-
sion defined "pollutant as "any . . . gase-
ous . . . irritant or contaminant, including
. . . vapor . . . fumes . . . and chemi-
cals." Accordingly, the paint fumes in
Nethery's claim fell under the definition of
gaseous substances, vapors, and fumes,
while the 1,1,1 tca in the paint was
plainly a chemical.
The insureds suggested that the fumes
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did not constitute an "irritant," because
they do not normally inflict injury. The
court quickly dismissed the argument, say-
ing that an irritant was a substance that
produced a particular effect, not one that
generally or probably caused such ef-
fects. Further, cases cited by the insureds
concerning the ambiguity of the exclusion
clause were unpersuasive. The -court of
appeals concluded that American State's
absolute pollution exclusion was
unambiguous and excluded Nethery's
claim.
- by Debbie Martinez
Colonial Properties, Inc. v. Vogue
Cleaners, Inc., 77 F.3d 384 (Ala.
1996)
The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama addressed
the question of whether improperly dis-
posed toxic wastes gave a landlord a
trespass cause of action against a tenant
for trespass to a common area. This was
a question of first impression in Alabama
and was reviewed by the United States
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
The case arose from Vogue Clean-
ers', Inc., (Vogue Cleaners) disposal of
toxic waste generated by a dry cleaning
operation. Vogue generated several
toxic wastes, most of which were prop-
erly disposed of by disposal companies.
However, toxic waste containing per-
chloroethylene was not disposed by these
companies, rather it was poured onto a
curb behind the business. This resulted in
several incidents in which workers were
burned by groundwater contaminated
with perchloroethylene. The Emergency
Response Management and Training Cor-
poration and the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management were called
to the scene to contain the waste and
assess the damage.
As a result, the landlord of the build-
ing, Colonial Properties, Inc., (Colonial
Properties) filed suit against Vogue Clean-
ers under several theories to recover dam-
ages. At issue in the instant case was
whether the district court properly held in
favor of Colonial Properties for the claim
of trespass against Vogue Cleaners for
damage to the common area contami-
nated by the toxic waste. Vogue Clean-
ers maintained the action was improper
since Colonial Properties did not have
exclusive control over the contaminated
area, thus preventing recovery for tres-
pass damages. Colonial Properties ar-
gued that it needed only to exercise
"sufficient" possession and control over a
common area to entitle a landlord to a
trespass cause of action. The district
court determined that the later was the
proper reasoning, and would apply were
the Alabama Supreme Court to address
the issue.
Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that since this is a case of first
impression, the district court should not
have speculated as to how the Alabama
Supreme Court would have ruled if con-
fronted with the issue. Accordingly, the
court certified the case to the Alabama
Supreme Court to answer the question of
whether the facts of this case give rise to
a trespass cause of action by a landlord
against a tenant for damages to a com-
mon area.
- by Marc Poston
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